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Are digital picturings representations? 
 
 
 
The philosopher of art Roger Scruton has claimed that photographic images are not 
representations, on the basis of the role of causal rather than intentional processes in arriving at 
the content of a photographic image (Scruton, 1981). His claim was controversial at the time, and 
still is, but had the merit of being a springboard for asking important questions about what kinds of 
representation result from the technologies used in depicting and visualising. In the context of 
computational picturing of different kinds, in imaging and other forms of visualisation, the 
question arises again, but this time in an even more interesting form, since these techniques are 
often hybrids of different principles and techniques. A digital image results from a complex inter-
relationship of physical, mathematical and technological principles, embedded within human and 
social situations. This paper consists of three sections, each presenting a view of the question 
whether digital imaging and digital visual artefacts generally are representations, from a different 
perspective. These perspectives are not representative, but aim only to accomplish what Scruton’s 
paper did succeed in accomplishing, that is, being a provocation and a springboard for a broader 
discussion. 
Digital images. Visualisation. Representation. Philosophy. Art. Science and technology studies. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The philosopher of art Roger Scruton has claimed 
that photographic images are not representations, 
on the basis of the role of causal rather than 
intentional processes in arriving at the content of a 
photographic image (Scruton, 1981). His claim was 
controversial at the time, and still is, but had the 
merit of being a springboard for asking important 
questions about what kinds of representation result 
from the technologies used in depicting and 
visualising. In the context of computational picturing 
of different kinds, in imaging and other forms of 
visualisation, the question arises again, but this 
time in an even more interesting form, since these 
techniques are often hybrids of different principles 
and techniques. A digital image results from a 
complex inter-relationship of physical, 
mathematical and technological principles, 
embedded within human and social situations. An 
extremely common, even natural, assumption 
about digital images is that they, like other images, 
are representations. Despite its apparent 
naturalness, it is an assumption that can be 
questioned. If digital images, or indeed other visual 
artefacts, are representations, why – in what ways 
are they continuous with other activities and 
practices of representing, and the goals and 
purposes of other forms of representations? What 
do they represent? What are the specific forms and 
modes of representation of computational and 
digital methods, and in what ways are they 
modulating expectations of representation, 
generally and specifically, in art? 
 
This paper speaks to the panel of the same title at 
this year’s EVA conference. It consists of three 
sections, each written by one of the panellists and 
presenting a view on picturings and representation. 
The first section, by Annamaria Carusi, sets the 
context of the debate by outlining the main points of 
Scruton’s argument, and raising three points of 
criticism of that argument, from the perspective of 
philosophy of art and of technology; the second 
section, by Gordana Novakovic, broaches the 
questions from the perspective of practicing artist, 
and raises further criticisms relating to the nature of 
digital interactive art, and the interface between 
neuroscience and art; the third section, by Timothy 
Webmoor, raises a set of questions from the 
perspective of science and technology studies. 
 
The three views outlined raise many overlapping 
issues. They converge on some points, and diverge 
on others. We did not attempt to arrive at 
agreement with each other prior to the panel 
discussion, since we are aiming first and foremost, 
to make space for a variety of views and 
perspectives. This paper’s further development, 
therefore, must be postponed until after the panel 
discussion. 
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2. A VIEW FROM PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND 
TECHNOLOGY: ANNAMARIA CARUSI 
In an article which is now a classic in the 
philosophy of art, a status it acquired in virtue of 
how much discussion and disagreement it has 
provoked rather than in the view that it expressed a 
lasting and deep truth about the nature of 
photography, the philosopher Roger Scruton 
claimed that photographs are not representational 
art. A photograph may be a representation in the 
same way as a realist or representational painting 
in that it shares (in some respects) the appearance 
of its subject; but a photograph’s mode of sharing 
this appearance is not, for Scruton, one that can 
hold our attention or interest, or finally have the 
same kind of aesthetic value, as the way in which a 
painting comes to be a representation. The central 
reason for this is the means through which each 
comes to have a certain appearance: a photograph 
has a particular visual appearance because of a 
causal relation between the device and the subject 
photographed; a painting, instead, has a particular 
visual appearance because of an intentional 
relation between the artist and the subject depicted. 
In this paper, we shall not focus so much on the 
question whether in fact Scruton was right in 
classifying photographs and paintings correctly on 
the side of the causal and the intentional. Rather 
we focus on the causal/intentional distinction itself 
as a way of understanding why representations 
hold our interest, and why they are of value to us. 
 
A causal relation implies that particular inferences 
can be made about the existence or nature of the 
subject represented: for example, from a 
photograph we are able to infer that some 
particular thing was actually there to be 
photographed and looked at in a particular way at 
the exact instant of being photograph being taken. 
The ‘thereness’ of photographs have been 
commented on by several others, including Roland 
Barthes, Susan Sontag and many others. We can 
be mistaken about the identity of the subject in the 
photograph, and we can be mistaken about what 
the particular thing actually is (a topic of great 
interest to science imaging) but that there is a 
something that appears a certain way – of this we 
can be certain (in the absence of meddling and 
manipulation – but this is too large a topic to be 
discussed here). For painting, instead, no particular 
thing need exist at a particular instant of time for 
the painting to have the visual appearance that it 
does. In order to answer the question why a 
painting looks a certain way, it makes sense to 
refer to the intentions of the painter; a painting is a 
representation by reference to the intentions of the 
artist (and here, we need to leave aside a deeper 
analysis of what exactly is meant by intentions, 
such as, the extent to which intentions are fully 
conscious or ‘inner’. Scruton does not imply that 
they are either of these in this paper and these 
views are inconsistent with his more general 
philosophy of art. The terms ‘intentions’ and 
‘intentionality’ in this paper cover intendings in the 
narrow sense (conscious intentions to carry out 
particular acts) and intentionality in the broad 
sense, of taking one thing to be about another, as 
occurs in perception, but also in meaning systems 
of all kinds). According to Scruton, a photograph is 
a representation as a record and not as the 
fulfilment of an intention, and that is also where its 
interest as a representation also lies. Of course 
photographs do involve intentions, including 
representational, stylistic, and aesthetic intentions, 
but these are not that in virtue of which they are 
representations – think of a CCTV camera. In a 
painting, instead, the artist presents us with a way 
of seeing the subject – and that’s also where the 
interest lies. What I see in a picture is not only its 
visual properties, but an interpretation of this mode 
of seeing. The point of a painting of a person, for 
example, is not ‘x looked like that’, but ‘he was 
seen like that by the painter’, and we are 
interpreting the mode of seeing as well as the 
visual appearance, or in the visual appearance. 
And this is precisely why paintings hold interest and 
value for us: because we’re interested in modes of 
seeing, in interpretations, in the variety of ways 
things appear to ourselves and others and not just 
in the way they do appear to no-one in particular. 
Paintings – and all art – hold our attention because 
of this pivotal role of intentionality in them. Of 
course, photographs have intentionality too: 
photography involves numerous choices of angles, 
shots, lighting, choices and arrangements of 
subjects: but – according to Scruton – finally, the 
reason that they represent is a causal one which 
comes apart from all of these manifestations of 
intentionality. This is at the same time why codified 
representations, such as the codified ticker tape 
indication of a crystal’s atomic structure (Scruton, 
1981, p. 590), is for Scruton, not interesting as a 
representation: if we ask why it looks as it does, we 
need to look for the reasons in the code, rather 
than in a mode of seeing. 
 
That intentionality has a central role in 
representation and the reasons we are interested in 
it is one claim. A further claim is that our 
interpretation of paintings is an interpretation of the 
ways in which intentionality is realised in a 
perceptual medium (in the case of painting a visual 
medium); and yet a further claim is that this 
involves us in interpreting or making sense of the 
‘characteristically human’ (Scruton, 1981, p. 581). 
 
Before we start to analyse terms such as 
intentionality, interpretation, and what, if anything, 
makes either of these ‘characteristically human’, let 
us recall that Scruton is not alone in holding the 
view that the mechanism whereby photographs 
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come to be representations is not the reason for 
which we value them as representations. Scruton 
himself quotes James Joyce, in the Paris 
Notebooks of 1904: 
Question: Can a photograph be a work of art? 
Answer: A photo- graph is a disposition of 
sensible matter and may be so disposed for an 
aesthetic end, but it is not a human disposition 
of sensible matter. Therefore it is not a work of 
art. 
But many others have expressed a similar view. 
The expression of the view in the film Monster’s 
Ball is as good as any other, and possibly more 
powerful. This exchange between Lawrence – the 
convicted murderer – and Hank – the prison guard 
-- occurs the night before Lawrence’s execution, as 
he is drawing Hank’s portrait: 
HANK 
My daddy took me to one of them picture men at 
the store, when I was little. Told me, when the 
man gave him the photo, they started to laugh. 
Said I'd never keep a woman with the face I got. 
LAWRENCE * 
I've always believed that a portrait captures a 
person much better than a photograph. Takes a 
human being to really see a human being. 
It is this role of human seeing, seeing as, taking to 
be, sense-making and the whole range of 
intendings, and the way in which they define what it 
is for something to represent something, that is at 
the heart of Scruton’s argument about 
representation, and the reason for which it is still 
worth returning to, even now when the discussion 
regarding whether photographs represent and have 
aesthetic value in virtue of their representing is 
rather antiquated. At the heart of this argument is 
the idea that nothing is a representation in the 
absence of the human interest in making it so; and 
that an important reason why we are so 
compellingly interested in aesthetic representations 
is what they tell us about human intentionality (in 
the broad sense!). The assiduousness with which 
we interpret works of art is an extension of our 
interest in other human doings and ways of being. 
 
If Scruton makes a mistake regarding where, in this 
distinction, he places photography and paintings, it 
is still interesting to ask whether this distinction is 
one which we can use to explore the 
representational nature of digital and computational 
art and images of all kinds. In the rest of this 
section, I wish to highlight three points for 
discussion: the first is Scruton’s understanding of 
the camera as a technological device which results 
in his placing it incorrectly in the causal/intentional 
divide; the second is the fact that digital and 
computational art complicate this distinction by 
bringing in a further term: information; the third is 
that Scruton’s distinction in fact depends on a 
further distinction, that between representing and 
represented thing which is not as absolute as is 
assumed for the purposes of his argument 
regarding what does and what does not represent. 
2.1. Questioning the place of cameras and other 
technologies on the causal/intentional 
spectrum 
On the first point: Scruton assumes that the camera 
is purely causal and that it does not, itself, embody 
intentionality. However, as a device, the camera is 
an intentional device, in that it has its place in the 
ongoing history of humankind’s inventiveness in 
finding ways of extending our own intentionality: 
that is, our own perceptual capacities. In this 
sense, the camera is not that different from the 
human visual system which has causal as well as 
intentional aspects: in order to see anything, we 
need to direct our attention to some things rather 
than others in our visual sphere, but we also have 
to have our eyes open so that the retina can be 
affected by light. It seems arbitrary to say that one 
causal/intentional mechanism results in a 
representation whereas another does not. Rather, 
the technologies that come to play a role in the way 
that we make sense of the world around us are 
themselves a way of playing out different modes of 
relating causality and intentionality, and even of 
modifying and extending them. Thus questions of 
representation cannot be considered independently 
of the technological systems that are used for 
representing. The technologies we use are not just 
a vehicle for achieving a representation, but are 
inextricably part of the act of representing and of 
our interest in representations and the value they 
hold for us. 
2.2. Questioning the causal/intentional 
distinction 
The second point is an extension of the previous 
point that technologies do not necessarily simply 
play out pre-existing modes of causality and 
intentionality but can modify them too. This is what 
we are seeing now with digital and computational 
imaging, which insert into the heart of the 
representational relation a third term, that of 
information. Software and computation generally 
are essentially ways of manipulating information. 
‘What is information?’ is a complex question to 
answer. While it is not the same as a cause (it is 
not, for example, light itself but information about 
light that operates in digital imaging), it is also not 
straightforwardly the same thing as intentionality if 
we understand by that human intentionality. This is 
a different point from the frequently made point that 
that ultimately it is humans who program the 
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computer and who therefore ultimately delimit the 
choices and decisions that form the 
representation). Rather the point is that the 
translations of light, contour, depth, etc, into 
information must also ‘mean’ something for the 
computer in order for the manipulations of 
information to be carried out, and that the process 
that ensues is not one that is fully due to human 
intentionality or physical causality, but to this further 
category of information acting upon information. 
Section 3.3 expands on this point as only someone 
like Gordana, able to experience the process from 
the inside, can do. This is the point where this form 
of representation breaks with the idea that 
representations are of such compelling interest to 
us because of what they tell us about human 
intentionality; or perhaps the reason they are so 
interesting is in virtue of the ways that the ways 
they disturb our conception of human intentionality? 
This is a point of speculation and debate which is 
taken up again in Section 4. 
2.3. Questioning the distinction between 
representing subjects and represented objects 
Finally, the third point is that there is a further 
distinction upon which the distinction between 
causal and intentional relations between visual 
artefacts and whatever is their subject is grounded. 
This relation could not be made without an 
underlying distinction which has on one side the 
representing item (painting, picture, diagram, 
image, visualisation, etc.) and on the other the 
represented item. In the case of visual more-or-less 
realist representation, this is often seen as the 
representing item and the represented item in 
some sense sharing the same appearance – as 
was seen in the case of Scruton. This is rather 
loose and vague – and rightly so – since there is an 
infinite variety of ways in which one thing can be 
said to ‘look like’ another or share its appearance. 
Here, I wish to focus on the idea that these two 
items can be so distinguished, or even that it is 
useful to do so in order to understand 
representation. Instead, I wish to point towards an 
alternate view of art and its meaning and 
significance to us. According to Merleau-Ponty, art 
expresses a connectedness and reciprocity 
between ourselves and the things with which we 
interact in our environments. Klee reported on the 
experience, when walking through a forest, of being 
looked at by trees as much of he looking at them, 
and Merleau-Ponty (1993, p. 127) expands on this 
point writing ‘The eye […] is that which has been 
moved by some impact of the world, which it then 
restores to the visible through the traces of a hand.’ 
The important thing here is not the traces of the 
hand result in a ‘copy’ (however abstracted, 
inexact, skewed or faithful) of the visible; but that it 
expresses the ways in which the visible has an 
‘internal equivalent’ in the perceiving (feeling, 
sense-making) body: 
Things have an internal equivalent in me; they 
arouse in me a carnal formula of their presence. 
Why shouldn’t these correspondences in turn 
give rise to some tracing rendered visible again, 
in which the eyes of others could find an 
underlying motif to sustain their inspection of the 
world? (Merleau-Ponty, 1993, p. 126) 
In notes posthumously published, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that the relation between perceivers and 
the world is not one whereby one is set over 
against the other, one on one side, and one on the 
other of some invisible divide, but rather that 
perceivers and world are in a circuit (2003: 223). 
Starting from one, we can’t but get to the other, 
without being able to say when exactly we crossed 
over. Art then is a way of expressing these 
crossings over between ourselves and the worlds 
we inhabit. The only thing that I would want to add 
is that this circuit includes the technologies that we 
use for the ‘crossings over’ – in ways that we have 
yet to explore. 
 
In this section we began by considering Scruton’s 
distinction between photography and painting on 
the basis of the causal or intentional ways in which 
they come to be representations and the 
implications he believes this have for the interest 
that paintings and photographs can have for us – 
human viewers – as representations. We then went 
on to question the way in which technologies are 
not considered by Scruton as themselves playing 
out causal/intentional relations, and even of making 
available different ways of thinking and 
experiencing these ways of being related to the 
world around us; we also questioned whether this 
distinction is sufficient to account for 
representations, and proposed that digital and 
computational technologies in fact bring into play 
another relation, the informational one. But this 
type of relation, actualised in computers, raises 
questions about human intentionality as the focus 
of interest in representations. Finally we have 
questioned the underlying distinction between 
representing and represented items, and proposed 
– following Merleau-Ponty – that there is not such a 
clear distinction to be made, but that rather, the 
artefacts that we produce for aesthetic interest may 
be ways of expressing a relations of reciprocity and 
crossing over between human beings and the world 
they inhabit, in which technologies play a crucial 
role. 
3. A VIEW FROM THE ART/SCIENCE 
INTERFACE: GORDANA NOVAKOVIC 
My exploration of the questions put to the panel is 
undertaken from the point of view of a practising 
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artist who uses digital technologies to produce 
collaborative interactive artworks that are inspired 
and informed by science. The easiest way for me to 
structure my answers is to change the key question 
slightly by replacing ‘picturings’ with ‘interactive 
digital artworks’, and then to use some of Roger 
Scruton’s observations on art, photography and 
cinema as points of contrast. This is not intended 
as a way of criticising Scruton’s views, which were 
expressed before digital technologies reached the 
mainstream, but as a way of bringing into the 
foreground his assumptions about the artist, the 
subject/object of representation, the artwork, and 
the viewer/participant, all of which are violated by 
the current practice of many artists, including 
myself. My approach to the question will be to 
examine these assumptions, and perhaps to show 
how the results of this examination can themselves 
constitute an answer. 
3.1 The artist 
Scruton’s paradigm case (his ‘ideal painting’) is of 
the solitary artist producing a work that represents 
some inner vision; it is the individual artist’s 
intention that separates painting from ‘ideal’ 
photography, which is merely causal. This 
emphasis on the individual is carried over to his 
analysis of cinema, where he attributes the 
intention behind a film to the director. However, in 
the case of film, it is certainly not the case that the 
final version of what may legitimately regarded as 
an artwork is the product solely of the director’s 
intention. Making a film is a collaborative enterprise 
where many roles and professions other than the 
director’s also contribute to the artistic dimension – 
for example, the actors, scriptwriters, and 
cameramen, among others – and the eventual 
output is constrained by material and financial 
factors that often lead to the final version falling 
short of the director’s original vision (hence the 
phenomenon of ‘the director’s cut’). I am not sure 
how easy it would be to extend Scruton’s 
arguments to include this messy reality in which 
there is no longer any single intention that the 
artwork can represent. 
 
Some art, at least, has moved on from the model of 
an object being wholly produced by an individual. 
This is particularly true of art, such as digital art, 
that depends on technologies that demand 
specialised knowledge that the artist does not 
possess. For example, much of my work over the 
last couple of decades has involved computer 
programmers, electronics engineers, and artificial 
intelligence experts. However, in my approach, 
these specialists are not merely the necessary 
tools for bringing my vision to reality; they and I 
form a collaborative team of equals, and the 
eventual output is ours, not mine. This idea of the 
team can also be seen in cinema, where some 
well-known directors sometimes abandon the idea 
of individual credit, as in Godard’s ‘Bande à part’, 
or ‘Nouvelle Vague’, or structure the development 
of the film as the outcome of ongoing workshops 
with the (sometimes amateur) actors, as in Peter 
Watkins’ ‘La Commune’. 
 
Digital technologies have also enabled and 
facilitated the use of generative techniques, where 
the role of the artist(s) and her/their collaborators is 
essentially to define a visual or other space that the 
artwork itself will explore. The detailed output of the 
final piece (which may or may not be time-based) is 
not completely known before it is produced, and in 
the case of the use of random or chaotic 
techniques may not even be knowable in principle. 
Exactly what is intentional here, where the outcome 
may go beyond anything conceived by the artist? 
3.2 The subject/object of representation 
The proliferation of new technologies has made it 
possible to access detailed information about 
things, typically involving very large (cosmic) or 
very small (subatomic) scales, that were previously 
confined to the realm of theoretical speculation. 
This has given rise to an entirely new field dealing 
with the representation of these (and other) 
scientific findings, and it has also become a source 
of inspiration for artists, particularly for the new 
discipline of art science. 
 
For ‘scientific’ visualisations, sonifications and 
audio-visualisations, there is of course a very 
natural concern with objectivity. In his essay, Roger 
Scruton discusses the relationship between the 
object of representation and the representation 
itself, especially in Section 6 where he considers 
his idea of representation in the context of his ‘ideal 
photograph’, and touches on the issue of the 
representation of scientific data with the example of 
an electron microscope which ‘punches out on a 
ticker tape a codified indication of a crystal’s atomic 
structure’. He asks whether this is a representation 
of the atomic structure, and decides that it is not 
because ‘such a concept of representation would 
be uninteresting indeed’. Here he misses two 
opportunities. The first is to point out, as any 
scientist would, that the atomic structure is not itself 
an absolute fact, but a theory expressed in the form 
of a model. There is no reality to represent – there 
is only an interpretation of the data that may turn 
out to be mistaken, just as Newton’s interpretation 
of his data had to give way to Einstein’s. The 
second is to observe that scientists rely to a great 
extent on visualisation – open any physics, 
chemistry, or biology textbook to see this – and the 
really interesting question for science is: what 
aspects of a visualisation make it a good 
representation of a theory that is itself an 
interpretation of data? 
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Within the realm of representing or using scientific 
data or models in art, the question of truthfulness 
seems to be inappropriate as long as the 
underlying scientific data are accurate. We might 
even say that all non-distorting representations of 
scientifically valid data are equally valid 
representations of natural phenomena. However, 
the real difference between an artistic interpretation 
and a representation produced specifically for 
scientific purposes is in the motivation, which 
entails the use of different methods and different 
final outcomes. For artists, the scientific findings, 
data or theory are only the starting points in the 
search for a metaphor. The artist’s intention is not 
limited to representing natural phenomena, but 
seeks to express ideas and/or emotions and to 
create conditions for communicating their vision to 
others. Of course, there is an endless variety of 
ways that this can be done. And if there is in the 
end a striking resemblance to the relevant natural 
phenomena, or a meticulous integration of accurate 
scientific findings within the artwork itself (in 
whatever form it might take), all of that is in the 
service of an artistic concept, and is not a primary 
motivation. 
3.3 The artwork 
Scruton’s view of an artwork (including a film) is 
essentially of a passive and unchanging object, 
image, or set of images. An interactive digital 
artwork is none of these – and neither is our daily 
life in the 21st century. The moment we step from 
the world of objects into the digitally enabled and 
facilitated world – whether in life or in art – this step 
resembles in a way the leap from classical to 
relativistic or quantum physics. Digital technologies 
have brought unprecedented changes, 
transforming all aspects of human activities in a 
very short period of time. As Virilio observes, ‘We 
are no longer in the world of Newton, but in the 
world of Einstein’ (Virilio, 2001). Everything 
appears familiar, but operates according to different 
laws, appears as ambiguous, and does not follow 
the familiar cause-and-effect linearity. In this 
context, the static object seems no longer to be 
adequate for manifesting artistic ideas. 
 
Tightly linked to, and enabled by, rapid 
technological development, new media and 
electronic arts have changed contemporary art with 
the introduction of interactivity, and with a constant 
emergence of new art forms and categories. 
Instead of Scruton’s paintings, photographs, 
sculptures, or prints, digital technologies offer a 
broad and ever-increasing selection of interfaces. 
Technological platforms range from mobile phones, 
through powerful laptops, to large networks 
controlling multiple lasers and light-beams 
projecting onto the sky; new ones appear almost on 
a daily basis, and any list will soon be out of date. 
The available artistic media now range from 
traditional localised and individual fine art 
techniques, to crowd sourcing on the distributed 
World Wide Web. However, they all have one thing 
in common: they are designed to transform and 
present digitally processed, generated or 
manipulated data into forms that our senses can 
engage with. Critically, the choice of forms and 
modalities is to a great extent free and flexible; a 
single computational process applied to the same 
set of data can now be presented by means of a 
huge variety of interfaces, dramatically changing 
the final outcomes and experiences. 
 
In relation to Roger Scruton’s article, how might we 
discuss intentionality and causality in the context of 
digitally enabled arts? In the realm of digitally 
enabled artefacts, the active nature of the software 
and hardware becomes significant. Hardware and 
software are not just tools any more. The 
computational processes involved often operate to 
a large extent beyond human control, and beyond 
the human level of intervention. In the most 
complex form of interactivity, the artefact itself 
changes as a consequence of interaction; equipped 
with its own 'nervous system', it 'senses' the 
participant, processes the received data and reacts 
accordingly, often using quasi-organic computer 
programmes. In The Address of the Eye: A 
Phenomenology of Film Experience, Vivian 
Sobchack offers a brilliant phenomenological 
analysis of cinematography, and of intentionality, 
and in particular of ‘machine-intentionality’, in film 
(Sobchack, 1991). Could we similarly attribute 
some form of extended 'machine-intentionality' to 
interactive installations? This goes far beyond 
Scruton’s idea of an artwork as a fixed passive 
object. 
 
We can take this further. An interactive installation 
can be described as a computer controlled and 
facilitated information exchange between two 
entities: the installation, and the participant. 
Creating an interactive work involves defining the 
software and hardware architecture that 
determines, provides and supports the interaction 
between the two entities. Because our sense of self 
depends critically on the perceived boundary 
imposed by the body, which is in turn mediated by 
the processing of sensory information, the 
intervention of the installation in this process can 
dissolve or alter this boundary. This means that 
clear boundaries cannot be defined either for the 
participant's bodily sense of self, or for the 
installation, and this makes it impossible to 
describe the installation as an object. Where can 
we go from here? 
 
In fact, interactive art is best defined as a process, 
or, more specifically, a complex system of 
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interdependent processes. In contrast to Scruton’s 
fine art artefacts, an interactive installation is not a 
passive reflective object. It creates a dynamic 
feedback process between the human body and 
the system. It is the participant who sets the 
interaction in motion and induces the process of 
interaction that depends upon h/er presence and 
activity. On the other hand, an interactive 
installation is dynamic and emissive, and tends to 
overpower the human body and mind; through the 
interaction, the participant can become an almost 
passive receiver. It is then the case that the 
installation actively manipulates our perceptions, 
rather than that we make sense of the perceptual 
situation. Compared to both cinematographic forms 
and fine art objects, the dominance of the role of 
the installation in this perceptual situation could be 
said to put the participant in the position of 
replacing the perception of an object by the 
observation of perception itself. 
3.4 The viewer/participant 
In his essay, Scruton says little about the viewer, 
but implies that s/he is a passive spectator in whom 
a certain experience will reliably be induced by the 
artwork. By making reference to the art of previous 
centuries, there is an implicit assumption that time 
and culture do not matter, or do not matter much. 
While this may be true to some extent in the 
context of painting, it is certainly false in the context 
of digitally enabled interactive art: established 
perceptual habit and familiarity play a significant 
role in our experience of digital media, and 
therefore in our response to interactivity. We know 
that our responses to sensory stimulation are 
shaped by our previous exposure to the 
standardised forms presented on TV or computer 
screens, and to our long-term exposure to typical 
audiovisual rhythms. This can lead to reduced 
perceptual capacity – for example, the auditory 
bandwidth of a citizen of a large Western city is 
much smaller than that of one who spent all her life 
in an intact natural environment. 
 
It can also lead to cognitive effects, and this led 
Peter Watkins, in his analysis of the audiovisual 
mass-media industry, to coin the term Monoform 
(Watkins, 2007). The Monoform is a standardised 
audiovisual language marked by a fragmented, 
high-speed succession of diverse sensations that 
fracture attention, and suspend reflective 
processes. But, as Watkins notes, ‘...a consistent 
use of the Monoform – with its total absence of time 
for reflection, its apparently seamless (and thus 
unquestionable) narrative thrust, its constant 
monolinear direction forward (denying flexibility of 
memory, and complexity of human experience) – 
has had both obvious and incalculable long-term 
effects on our feelings. It has desensitised us to 
many of the things that occur both on the screen, 
and everywhere around us...’ The response to an 
interactive installation of an individual who has 
been exposed to the Monoform for decades or 
more will be very different from that of someone 
from a less technologically developed culture. 
 
There are large differences even between 
individuals within the same culture. It might help to 
give an example from my own practice in 
connection with the ongoing Fugue project 
(Novakovic, 2009). In Fugue, the virtual immune 
system engages with a fictional virus. At the heart 
of the piece is a complex piece of scientific 
software, an artificial immune system algorithm, 
which accurately mimics the cascading responses 
to infection of the human immune system. No two 
responses will ever be the same, and the time 
scale and outcome of the struggle is always 
unpredictable. However, Fugue does not just 
display what could be seen under a microscope. 
Instead, we have transformed the data generated 
by the artificial immune system into symbols that 
express the dynamics and the rhythm of the 
biological processes. While the visuals reflect one 
view of events in the underlying immune system 
when it is infected by an artificial virus, the sound 
reflects another, and always in a new and 
unpredictable way. The piece has been exhibited in 
various formats, using different interfaces, but in all 
of these the computational processes remained 
exactly the same, except in the case of the full 
interactive version where an additional software 
package enabled the system to respond to the 
participants as if they were yet another component 
of the computational model of the immune system. 
 
In spite of the fact that in all its variants the 
underlying software is identical, the responses from 
the participants have been quite unpredictable, and 
they have varied largely depending on the form of 
the interface. In the simplest screen-based free 
running display, a significant number reported an 
immersive, almost meditative experience, although 
no classical immersive technology was involved. 
Even the author of the 3D modelling, Dr Anthony 
Ruto, remarked that he sometimes plays it on his 
computer, in his own words, ‘just to relax’. This 
response contradicted our expectations, especially 
since we had designed a full-scale interactive 
installation with the intention of inducing meditative 
effects, but none of the participants had reported 
any. However, different age groups responded in 
very different ways to the interactive installation. 
Those who had grown up with digital technologies, 
the so-called ‘digital natives’ (Prensky, 2001), put 
considerable effort into trying to uncover the 
triggers for the interactive effects. (They were 
unsuccessful because this was, in fact, deliberately 
made impossible.) Their behaviour contrasted 
sharply with that of the non-natives, namely the 
generations who had encountered digital and 
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interactive technologies later in their lives, who 
enjoyed exploring and experiencing the 
environment in a playful, relaxed way, without 
consciously attempting to manipulate it. It appears 
that both habit and familiarity with technology play 
significant roles in the ways that people perceive 
and react to digital images and sounds, and that 
these factors may become most transparent in 
interactivity. 
 
It seems clear that the theory and practice related 
to traditional object-oriented plastic arts are of little 
help in understanding the phenomena associated 
with interactive digital art. However, the nature of 
the complex processes involved when the human 
body and mind encounter and interact with digital 
technologies has now become a focus of attention 
in various fields. Within the sphere of digitally 
mediated art, researchers and practitioners have 
explored many of the technical, conceptual, and 
experiential aspects of this enigma over the last 
forty years, but one critical aspect – exploring and 
exploiting the changes in the brain that are directly 
related to the nature of digital technologies – is still 
relatively untouched. 
 
A potentially promising approach is the 
neuroscientific subdiscipline of neuroaesthetics, 
pioneered by Professor Semir Zeki (1999). This 
groundbreaking paradigm has opened an entirely 
new area in which both artists and neuroscientists 
look at the neurobiological basis of creating and 
experiencing the plastic arts. Working within the 
scientific concept of the visual brain, it is essentially 
focused on vision and static objects. However, the 
area of contemporary artistic practice that 
neuroaesthetics leaves unexplored are the multi-
sensory experiences within the growing body of 
process-based arts enabled by digital technologies, 
such as interactive art. 
 
A possible new direction has recently appeared 
with the emergence of the science of brain 
plasticity, the study of the ways in which the brain 
can radically reconfigure itself under certain 
conditions. This has conclusively shown that the 
brain can no longer be regarded as a fixed, closed, 
passive receiver of information from the senses – a 
mere processor for the information that is 
controlling our body through a kind of one-way 
communication. We are now seeing the recognition 
of growing scientific evidence that the brain is in 
fact almost nakedly open to external influences, 
and is capable of rapid and radical change by 
remodelling itself through learning and interaction 
with the environment. What is needed now is for 
these insights to be extended and explored in the 
context of art, perhaps in the ways outlined in my 
Manifesto for Neuroplastic Arts (Novakovic, 2007). 
 
But will neuroscience bring the final answers to all 
perception-related questions, the enigma of digitally 
enabled artefacts included? Perhaps not, because 
a new and strong critique that challenges many 
current dogmas has now appeared from the field of 
neurophenomenology, a discipline firmly grounded 
in the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, but 
also embracing recent research in neuroscience. A 
key figure is Alva Noë, who is part philosopher, part 
cognitive scientist, and part neuroscientist. 
Together with Evan Thompson and others, he 
offers a hypothesis about perception in action 
which builds on Merleau-Ponty’s idea of perception 
as a process of interaction between the embodied 
and situated human and the world. (He also 
believes that artists should not just be objects of 
scientific investigation, as they are in 
neuroaesthetics, but should actively contribute to 
the fields of perception and consciousness 
studies.) 
 
Noë’s iconoclastic views can be seen in his most 
recent book Out of our Heads (Noë, 2009) where 
he says: ‘Our culture is obsessed with the brain—
how it perceives; how it remembers; how it 
determines our intelligence, our morality, our likes 
and our dislikes. It is widely believed that 
consciousness itself, that Holy Grail of science and 
philosophy, will soon be given a neural explanation. 
And yet, after decades of research, only one 
proposition about how the brain makes us 
conscious—how it gives rise to sensation, feeling, 
and subjectivity—has emerged unchallenged: we 
don’t have a clue.’ It will be interesting to see 
whether and how Noë’s approach will affect our 
understanding of interactive digital artworks in the 
future. 
3.5 Coda 
Although I have not answered the original question 
directly, I hope that I have shown that, in my own 
practice, the questions that most need answering 
are those hidden in the assumptions made in the 
paper that is the focus of this panel. 
4. A VIEW FROM SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
STUDIES: TIMOTHY WEBMOOR 
Shifting Scruton’s question to the register of digital 
modes of engagement is helpful as long as we 
recover his starting position in metaphysical 
speculation, rather than build from or contest his 
conclusions concerning representation. That is, his 
conclusions for aesthetic value clearly rest upon a 
separation of human agency from what might be 
termed mechanical or nonhuman agency. 
Nevertheless, his initial invitation to speculate 
about the nature of agency in terms of 
representational practices is both useful and 
potentially heterodox. 
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4.1. Science, representation and ratios of 
agency 
Philosophers and historians of science have 
similarly developed criteria for representations 
through underscoring the ratios of human-
nonhuman agency involved in their production. 
Daston and Galison’s (2007, p. 115) epistemic 
virtue of ‘mechanical objectivity,’ dominant in the 
late 19th century, emphasises the ‘causal’ type of 
relationship Scruton attributed to the celluloid 
chemistry of the camera and the ambient light rays 
entering the aperture. The increasing ubiquity and 
affordability of instruments for recording during this 
threshold period of early modern science 
encouraged a technological ‘hype.’ Ostensibly 
about the instruments to aid the ‘scientific 
imagination’ (Hankins and Silverman, 1995), the 
technophilia was really about the representational 
prowess they could bring to scientific research. 
Such subject-less image producing representations 
facilitated the expansion of experimental science. 
Physically, through requiring more laboratory 
space, technicians, infrastructural and institutional 
support for the sophisticated equipment. But, more 
importantly, the greater production of these 
mechanically standardised representations allowed 
them to be circulated widely amongst far-flung 
colleagues without distortion. As Latour’s (1986) 
‘immutable mobiles’ these instrumental inscriptions 
functioned as epistemic circuitry enervating an 
increasingly global science. A physical network of 
circulating representational results that worked as 
an ‘epistemological engine,’ accelerating scientific 
advances through expanding practitioners’ ability to 
‘virtually witness’ experiments at-a-distance 
(Woolgar & Coopmans, 2006; Shapin, 1984). The 
trust to accept, build upon and develop the 
experimental results of others based upon the 
collateral security of representations rendered 
through the neutral and uncaring causality of 
technology. 
4.2 Machinic agency 
 
It seems that, according to Daston and Galison’s 
reconstruction, early modern science thought good 
representation was the absence of human agency. 
Such machinic objectivity gave great ballast to the 
progress of early modern science. It is no wonder, 
then, that the ‘enchantment of technology’ (Gell, 
1992) continues to hold many spellbound to the 
epistemological promises of representations 
produced by instruments in the service of science. 
Of course, work by scholars of contemporary 
science (Daston & Galison, 2007; Hacking, 1983), 
particularly those examining everyday practices of 
scientists (Amann & Knorr-Cetina, 1990; Latour & 
Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1986), underscores that 
instruments do not produce representations alone. 
Contrary to Scruton’s portrayal of a purely causal 
camera, making scientific representations involves 
practitioner and technology in a collective activity 
more akin to craftwork; a material engineering of 
media. So while Scruton’s causal camera and the 
‘mechanical objectivity’ of early modern science 
described by Daston and Galison use inverted 
ratios of human-nonhuman agency for defining 
‘representation,’ they both uphold this fundamental 
division that may no longer be so analytically useful 
for understanding representations. 
4.3 Collective agency 
What if, as Daston and Galison (2007, pp. 39–41) 
intimate and many Science and Technology 
Studies scholars explicitly suggest (e.g. Latour, 
1992), we think through representation not in terms 
of the repetitive debates of epistemology, but rather 
ontologically? To go back to Scruton’s initial 
speculation in terms of agency, yet not insist upon 
classifying agency according to what is human and 
what is machinic. That is, to not separate off 
representation from ‘representer.’ What would 
representation look like under an agnostic agency? 
There are other motivations for doing so, 
particularly with respect to digital images. 
 
Firstly, as Anne Freedberg (2006) and other art 
historians admirably detail, unlike Leon Battista 
Alberti’s initial realist windows, digital images as 
‘virtual windows’ are dynamic interfaces. More 
interactive display-cum-control panels than the 
isolated information of analog representations. As 
digital images become ubiquitous, attached to us 
as ‘everyware,’ haptically responsive and 
increasingly visually immersive with gaming and 
social networking ‘second worlds,’ the 
phenomenological lesson of relatedness becomes 
technologically embodied. Already our mode of 
everyday engagement with digital images – on our 
iPhones or before our many Graphical User 
Interfaces – reminds us of our cyborg nature. 
These so many visual prostheses augmenting ‘our’ 
agency (Manovich, 2006). 
 
Secondly, if we consider digital images from an 
ontological perspective, we sidestep the many 
contentious and irresolvable disputes that bind 
‘representation’ to epistemological worries of fidelity 
and correspondence (Putnam, 1988). These 
debates would continue to have us, as they did for 
early modern science, making arbitrary incisions 
between proverbial objects and subjects. Now, 
these long-standing divisions were thought to help 
ascertain whether representations were produced 
according to the Mertonian ideals of science that 
tipped the ratio of agency away from subjectivity. 
With digital media, we must still sift out signal from 
noise in our images. But thinking in terms of a 
collective agency shifts their evaluation as 
‘representations’ to their ontological capacity for 
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action. It is in keeping with an engineering and 
design sensibility. What matters is their effect or 
their capacity for action in performing tasks. 
 
Our collective work with digital images amounts to 
Hacking’s (1983) electrons and positrons. Along 
with other phenomena in particle or astro-physics, 
we may endlessly debate their reality in terms of 
how they are represented; whether this or that 
image is an accurate and undistorted proof. But the 
collective action of practitioners and instruments 
allows them to be sprayed onto a niobium ball to 
alter charges. Their efficacy is real so they are not 
doubted. That is, in step with the increased 
sophistication of instrumentation, our collective 
capacity for ‘intervention’ comes to be the 
epistemic guarantor of scientific results: ‘It is 
because entities that in principle cannot be 
‘observed’ are regularly manipulated to produce a 
new phenomenon and to investigate other aspects 
of nature’ (Hacking, 1983, pp. 262). Fidelity may be 
futile, whereas pragmatic criteria, the ability to get 
work done and accomplish specific tasks in 
research, are what count. 
 
Thinking in terms of the collective agency of 
ourselves-with-our-media may indeed seem 
speculative and heterodox. It runs contrary to 
Scruton’s and most other anthropocentric 
approaches to agency. Or rather, it gives up on 
splitting hairs over attributing causality through the 
determination of agency’s owner as if it were a 
proprietary commodity. It is an approach more like 
digital ‘copyleft.’ Use is encouraged as opposed to 
ownership. Moreover, in emphasising output or 
effect, a collective agency inverts a search for 
‘origins’ or the initiation of action, as with Scruton’s 
human endowed with Franz Brentano’s 
intentionality. Agency comes as the end, not the 
beginning, of representation. It is performed, not a 
background condition. 
 
So, are digital picturings or images represent-
ations? If we remain insistent with Scruton that 
human intention is the magic ingredient of 
representation, then we can say yes. Or at least 
that they are ‘part representation.’ On the other 
hand, if we obdurately demand with 19th century 
scientists that representations must be subject-
less, we can equally affirm their status as part 
representations. Perhaps more usefully, and in step 
with our increasing immersion in digital media, is to 
suggest that we are part of any complete 
representations. 
5. CONCLUSION 
There will no doubt be more than these three views 
and perspectives at the panel discussion, and in 
the broader discussion around these issues. Rather 
than trying to conclude neatly on a common view 
that we can all share – which, just because it can 
be universally shared, will probably not be the most 
interesting insight about the potentiality of digital 
picturings – perhaps we can only point to a 
common attitude, and that is, that it makes a 
difference how we conceive of these digital 
picturings that are currently forcefully shaping our 
visual world. Despite drawing upon different 
literatures, fields, and practices, there is a 
convergence in the three perspectives put forward 
here on the view that the inherited categories for 
understanding representation, with their attendant 
baggage of dichotomies, between human and 
machine, between subject and object, and between 
represented and represented thing, are no longer 
tenable. Force for abandoning these distinctions 
comes from the very topic of this conference and 
from our modes of engaging digital media. 
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